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ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS AND RESTRICTIONS ON
COLLEGE ATHLETES: STUDENT CENSORSHIP?
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social networks such as Facebook and Myspace allow mem-
bers to communicate online, link themselves to friends, post photos,
buy each other gifts, dedicate songs to each other, join social groups,
and create a unique profile expressing their personal interests. But
what happens when such an innovative, easily accessible network is
used by college athletes in positions of leadership to showcase their
social lives off the playing field?
In late 2005, University of Kentucky administration began using in-
criminating Facebook photos to convict its students of alcohol-related
violations.' These investigative and disciplinary practices have caught
on among thousands of colleges, universities, and even high schools
across the world. In an attempt to alleviate the risk of losing their
athletes as a result of such disciplinary proceedings, some athletic de-
partments are finding ways to restrict or monitor student-athlete par-
ticipation in online social networks.
In December 2005, Florida State administrators instructed coaches
to randomly run Facebook searches on their student-athletes. The re-
sults shocked them into reform. Pictures of student-athletes attending
parties where underage drinking was the theme and postings with ref-
erence to sex and partying were found on more than half the athletes'
profiles. A meeting was held the following week, and athletes were
given ten days to cleanse their profiles.2
Loyola University Chicago went further and completely banned its
student-athletes from participation in Myspace and Facebook earlier
that year, regardless of how clean their profiles appeared, citing as
justification concerns over violations of their code of conduct resulting
from statements and pictures available online.3
Kent State, DePaul University, and University of Minnesota have
followed Loyola's lead and completely banned athletes from
1. S. Daniel, Facebook and Athletes, The Kentucky Democrat, Jan. 27, 2006, available at http://
kydem.blogspot.com/2006/01/facebook-and-athletes.html.
2. Erik Brady & Daniel Libit, Alarms Sound over Athletes' Facebook Time, USA Today, Mar.
8, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/internetprivacy/2006-03-08-athletes-web
sites x.htm.
3. Andrew Peters, Facebook Filled with Interest and Ignorance, The Tartan, Apr. 3, 2006,
available at http://www.thetartan.org/2006/4/3/news/facebook
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Facebook and Myspace, while others, such as University of Kentucky,
and Baylor, have adopted a more lenient system, such as that of Flor-
ida State, to monitor student-athlete profiles and ensure usage of on-
line networks in a proper manner.4
Given the alarming number of participants belonging to these net-
works, over fifty million and growing by .6 percent daily,5 there is a
substantial amount of opposition to such restrictions. But do these
restrictions, as alleged by some in opposition, rise to the level of stu-
dent suppression running afoul to the First Amendment when imple-
mented by state universities and public high schools?
This question requires an analysis of student-athletes, the First
Amendment, and online social networks. This will begin with a dis-
cussion of student-athletes' decreased expectations of privacy, as well
as the institutions' interests in the health, safety, and morals of its stu-
dent-athletes. Next, the First Amendment should be defined and its
interpretation explained so that we may see how it applies to Internet
speech specifically. Then we will see what happens when student-ath-
letes participate in Internet speech through online social networks by
defining such networks and considering student-athletes' right to free
speech in order to determine whether a complete ban on participation
results in student suppression in violation of the free speech guaran-
teed by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
II. STUDENT ATHLETES
Since athletic programs were introduced to high schools, colleges,
and universities, student-athletes have held a unique position. This
unique position is argued to justify additional monitoring of athletes'
behavior by administration in order to ensure athletes are fulfilling
their contractual obligations and upholding the morals of the institu-
tion. These administrators argue that voluntary membership in an
athletic program, usually involving some kind of contractual obliga-
tions by both parties, as well as athletes' status as role models among
their peers, justifies violating students' fundamental rights to free
speech and privacy.
The most effective argument advanced by institutions seeking to in-
vade their athletes' fundamental rights seems to be a justification
based on the health, safety, and morals of those athletes, which is ar-
4. Brady, supra note 2.
5. http://midnightexcess.wordpress.com/2007/11/22/exercise-for-the-reader-facebook-member-
stats/
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gued to require invasion in the form of monitoring athletes' behavior
to ensure they don't endanger themselves or other athletes.
These justifications for privacy invasion will be considered in the
following section, using Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton.6
Vernonia involves a public grade school in Oregon, where Acton
wished to play football but refused to consent to the random drug
testing policy adopted by the school district to combat drug use by
student-athletes and its effects on the educational environment, alleg-
ing intrusion upon his constitutionally protected right to privacy.
These justifications and their analysis will then be carried over and
applied to institutional invasions on free speech in later discussion.
A. Decreased Expectation of Privacy
Courts have held that public school children have lesser privacy ex-
pectations than the general population, as evidenced by medical ex-
amination and vaccinations requirements. Student-athletes, they have
held, have even less legitimate privacy expectations, given their volun-
tary membership in extracurricular activities, as well as their status as
role models among their school and community.7
1. Voluntary Membership
By voluntarily choosing to participate in athletic programs, either
by trying out or signing up for team membership, students voluntarily
subject themselves to a higher degree of regulation than that imposed
on the general student body.8 These athletes are then required to ac-
quire adequate insurance coverage or sign a waiver thereof, maintain
a minimum grade point average, and comply with any other rules of
conduct embodied in their player agreement. 9
These Vernonia holdings came about as a result of the institutions'
observations of a drug problem of epidemic proportions infesting its
high schools and causing increased disciplinary actions, classroom dis-
ruptions, and disciplinary reports, as well as faculty observation of
drug use or the glamorization of drugs and alcohol by the student
body.' 0
As a result of the perceived need for institutional reform in that
case, District officials developed a drug-testing program in an effort to
combat the chaos resulting from student rebellion fueled by drug use.
6. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
7. Id. at 657.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 663.
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The Student Athlete Drug Policy requires athletes to sign a form con-
senting to the testing, as well as written consent of the athletes' par-
ents." Officials targeted athletes as leaders of the drug culture,
expressing particular concern with the increased risk these individuals
posed if using drugs. 12 Before implementing the new policy, District
officials held a parent input night, which generated unanimous
approval.' 3
The procedure adopted to randomly test student-athletes for drug
use was administered on a weekly basis. All athletes' names were
placed in a pool from which a supervised student would draw the
names of ten percent to be tested on that same day, if possible. Those
chosen would identify any prescription medications prior to urinalysis
and provide a copy of the prescription or doctor authorization. They
would then be taken to an empty locker room, accompanied by an
adult monitor of the same sex. Males were then required to provide a
sample at a urinal while fully clothed, with their back to the monitor
who listens for normal sounds. Females were allowed to use an en-
closed bathroom stall with the monitor outside listening for normal
sounds.14
Acton and his parents refused to sign the testing consent forms, ar-
guing the policy violated their Fourth Amendment right against un-
reasonable searches and seizures.' 5 The Fourth Amendment provides
that the Federal Government shall not violate "the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures . . . "16 and extends to searches and
seizures by state officers through the Fourteenth Amendment.17
The court held in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn.18 that
state-compelled collection and testing of urine constitutes a search
subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.19 The reason-
ableness of the governmental search, which is the ultimate measure of
constitutionality, is judged by balancing the governmental intrusion on
individuals' Fourth Amendment rights against governmental promo-
tion of legitimate interests. 20
11. Id. at 650.
12. Id. at 649.
13. Id. at 650.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 651.
16. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213.
17. Id.
18. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
19. Id. at 617.
20. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
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Vernonia involved a warrantless search, void of the typically neces-
sary probable cause under the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amend-
ment.2 1 In order to justify such a search, the government must
demonstrate a special need, wherein the requirement of a warrant
would "unduly interfere with the swift and informal disciplinary pro-
cedures needed, and strict adherence to the requirement that searches
be based upon probable cause would undercut the substantial need of
teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the
schools." 22
The court has upheld suspicionless searches and seizures to conduct
drug testing in a number of different "special needs" situations, in-
cluding drug testing of railroad personnel involved in train accidents, 23
random drug testing of federal customs officers who carry arms or are
involved in drug interdiction,24 to maintain automobile checkpoints
looking for illegal immigrants and contraband, 25 and drunk drivers.26
In evaluating the policy's constitutionality, the nature of the privacy
interest intruded upon is the first factor for consideration. Because
the students subject to the policy were children committed to the tem-
porary custody of the State as public schoolmaster, the court in
Vernonia held unemancipated minors lack some fundamental rights as
subject to the control of their parents or guardians. 27 The educational
environment requires close supervision of schoolchildren, in addition
to the enforcement of rules regulating schoolchildren's conduct, even
if that equates to permissible adult conduct. 28
The degree of governmental intrusion in Vernonia depended on the
manner in which the urinalysis was collected and since this case in-
volved no less privacy than the amount typically encountered in public
restrooms, the privacy concerns were viewed as negligible.29 Further-
more, the locker room in which student-athletes suit up is far less pri-
vate than a traditional public restroom, with no individual dressing
rooms, no curtains or separating partitions between showers, and an
inherent element of communal undress.30
21. Vernonia, supra, at 654.
22. Id. at 651 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.0., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985)).
23. Id. at 653 (quoting Skinner, supra, at 617).
24. Id. (quoting Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989)).
25. Id. (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, at 560-561 (1976)).
26. Id. (quoting Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 452 (1990)).
27. Vernonia, supra, at 652.
28. T.L.O., supra, at 339.
29. Vernonia, supra, at 647.
30. Id. at 657.
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The Actons further alleged the policy at issue was more intrusive
than the purely physical aspect by requiring student-athletes to iden-
tify in advance of testing any prescription medications they were tak-
ing. The court previously addressed this issue in Skinner, holding that
requiring advance disclosure of medications is not a significant inva-
sion of privacy.31 The Actons distinguished their situation from Skin-
ner, arguing that disclosure to teachers and coaches, those who know
the student personally, is a greater invasion of privacy than the situa-
tion in Skinner, where disclosure went only to medical personnel col-
lecting the sample. 32
The general authorization form said the information would be re-
leased to the Vernonia School District and to the parents or guardians
of the student and nowhere required a school official to take medical
information from the student, though that was the usual practice.33
Furthermore, the court held that if medication was to be disclosed,
confidential procedures could be taken in providing the doctor's au-
thorization to the medical personnel testing the urinalysis. 34 In light
of these procedures, the court held the invasion of privacy at issue was
not significant.
2. Student-Athletes as Role Models
The court in Vernonia supported the District's suspicionless
searches based, in part, on the status of student-athletes as role mod-
els, reasoning that the drug problem fueled by athletes would be effec-
tively addressed by making sure athletes do not use drugs.35 The
Actons argued less intrusive means were available, particularly testing
based on individualized suspicion of drug use, but the court refused to
declare that only the least intrusive means available would survive the
reasonableness test set forth under the Fourth Amendment. 36
The court reasoned that the alternative suggested by the Actons
would impair other policies important to the institution, such as pa-
rental support of the policy in place at the time, risk of arbitrary test-
ing imposed on troublesome students, the expense of defending law
suits alleging arbitrary imposition, and adding the new function of
spotting and reporting suspected drug abuse to ill-prepared teachers.37
31. Id. at 659 (quoting Skinner, supra, at 626.)
32. Id. at 659.
33. Id. at 660.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 663.
36. Skinner, supra, at 629.
37. Vernonia, supra, at 664.
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3. Institutions' Interests in the Health, Safety, and Morals of Their
Athletes
The second factor for consideration in evaluating the constitutional-
ity of the Vernonia policy was the nature and immediacy of the gov-
ernmental concern and the efficacy of the means used to meet it.38
Compelling interests have been recognized in cases of preventing rail-
way accidents, 39 and ensuring fitness of customs officials to handle
firearms and interdict drugs.40 In the absence of individualized suspi-
cion, Vernonia must demonstrate a compelling need for the program,
argued in this case to be deterring drug use. 41
Evidence of this compelling need was presented in the form of the
effects of drug use in a student's school years when the physical, psy-
chological, and addictive effects on the individual are the most severe,
and the entire student body, faculty, and educational process is dis-
rupted. 42 Furthermore, for athletes in particular, impairment of judg-
ment, slowed reaction times, lessened perceptions of pain, and
physical responses to specific drugs such as amphetamines, marijuana,
and cocaine, pose substantial physical risks to student-athletes. 43
B. Drug Testing for College Athletes
Drug testing for college athletes pose a different invasion, since the
students in attendance at the institution seeking to supervise them and
thereby intrude upon their fundamental right of privacy, are not chil-
dren, but free adults. Without the justification of authorities acting in
loco parentis, with the power and duty to "inculcate the habits and
manners of civility," 4 4 institutions seeking to intrude upon fundamen-
tal rights must rely on a different legal relationship.
For public institutions, the Colorado Supreme Court held random,
suspicionless drug testing of student-athletes violated the Fourth
Amendment and the Colorado Constitution.45 The University of Col-
orado applied the "special needs" analysis set forth in Skinner, to de-
fend its program, pointing to the diminished expectation of privacy for
student-athletes, including the regulation of off-campus behavior.
38. Id. at 660.
39. Id. at 661 (quoting Skinner, supra, at 628).
40. Id. at 661 (quoting Von Raab, supra, at 670).
41. Id. at 661.
42. Id. at 661.
43. Id. at 662.
44. Id. at 665 (quoting Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, at 681 (1986)).
45. University of Colorado Through Regents of University of Colorado v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d
929, 946 (1993).
2008] 25
26 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. [Vol. 5:19
They further asserted their interest in promoting fair competition and
detection of drug abuse to outweigh the intrusion, but the court re-
fused to characterize student-athletics as a pervasively regulated in-
dustry to find such a diminished expectation since prohibited
participation could jeopardize scholarships and injure future coaching
careers of student-athletes. 4 6
For private institutions, the California Supreme Court held in Hill v.
National Collegiate Athletic Assn.4 7 that the NCAA drug testing pro-
gram for college athletes at Stanford, requiring a urine sample be pro-
vided in the presence of a same sex monitor, did not violate the
athletes' right of privacy under the California Constitution due to both
a diminished expectation of privacy, demonstrated by the close regula-
tion of student-athletes' physical fitness and bodily condition, as well
as interests in integrity, health, and safety.4 8 The court distinguished
itself from Derdeyn based on their private nature, stating "the perva-
sive presence of coercive government power in basic areas of human
life typically pose greater dangers to the freedoms of citizenry than
action by private persons." 49
III. FREE SPEECH
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances."50 Speech is of special value in the
educational system, as it encourages diverse thoughts and the market-
place of ideas.
In this section, we will look at how the First amendment is inter-
preted in the school setting, and then look to its application to speech
occurring on the Internet to determine whether a ban on athletes' par-
ticipation in online social networks by institutional officials violates
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
A. The First Amendment Interpreted and Applied
The First Amendment prevents government from proscribing
speech because of disapproval of the ideas expressed.5 1 But the right
46. Id. at 959.
47. 865 P.2d 633 (1994).
48. Id. at 637.
49. Id. at 656.
50. U.S. Const. amend. I.
51. Id.
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of freedom of expression is not absolute at all times and under all
circumstances; speech can be regulated if it is likely to inflict unac-
ceptable harm, including fighting words, types of defamatory speech,
and true threats. 52 Courts in First Amendment cases are typically re-
quired to consider and balance the constitutional right of the student
with the preservation of order and a proper educational
environment.53
In order to prohibit speech and punish a student for speech, the
school must sustain its burden of establishing that the student speech
materially disrupts class work, creates substantial disorder, invades
the right of others, or it is reasonably foreseeable that the speech will
do so.54 Speech communicated on-campus requires consideration of
several factors, including the form of speech, the effect of the speech,
the setting in which the speech is communicated, and whether the
speech is part of a school-sponsored expressive activity. 55
The Supreme Court has expanded First Amendment protections
against content and viewpoint regulation, as well as created and ex-
panded a series of doctrines permitting the government to regulate
speech incidentally. 56 The Court has permitted the government to
regulate certain categories of speech in order to control the "secon-
dary effects" of that speech,57 created an exception to general content-
regulation rules according to which the government may restrict (or
prohibit altogether) speech on government property, speech by gov-
ernment employees, or speech by those accepting government funds,58
allowed local communities to prohibit speech of a sexual nature based
on sexual mores significantly more repressive than those of the urban
communities that define the standard for sexual behavior in much of
the country,59 and devised a standard for regulating the time, place,
and manner of otherwise protected speech. 60
Furthermore, certain types of speech can be regulated if likely to
inflict unacceptable harm and are categorized as unprotected
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Steven G. Gey, Fear of Freedom: The New Speech Regulation in Cyberspace, 8 Tex. J.
Women & L. 183 (1999).
57. Id. at 183 (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986)).
58. Id. at 183 (quoting International Socy for Krichna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672
(1992)).
59. Id. at 184 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
60. Id. at 184 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)).
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speech.61 Unprotected speech includes fighting words,62 obscenity,63
certain types of defamatory speech, 64 and true threats. 65
One of the often-argued secondary effects of speech otherwise pro-
tected is the immediate incitement of illegal conduct, as was the case
in Brandenburg v. Ohio.6 6 In that case, the court held where a state-
ment amounts to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some
indefinite future time, it is protected by the First Amendment as it was
not an immediate incitement. 67
Another consideration in determining whether speech can legally
be regulated is whether there was a true threat made through such
speech, as was the case in J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District. That
case involved an eighth grade student who created a website, entitled
"Teacher Sux," on his home computer and posted it on the Internet.68
While the website contained a page referring to the student's alge-
bra teacher captioned "Why Should She Die," included a request for
donations to pay for a hitman, and caused the teacher to fear for her
life, resulting in stress, anxiety, loss of appetite, loss of sleep, loss of
weight, loss of well being, short-term memory loss, inability to leave
her house, headaches, and inability to return to school, the court held
statements made by J.S. did not constitute a true threat. 69
The standard applied by the court in determining whether the state-
ments constituted a true threat, developed in Lovell v. Poway Unified
School District,70 was whether a reasonable person in the student's
position would foresee that the statement would be interpreted as a
serious expression of intent to harm or assault.71
So where does the speech made available through online social net-
works fit in? Can it be restricted under any of these doctrines? Can
all athletes' speech be restricted as a result of one of their expressions
fitting into a category of unprotected speech? These questions require
an analysis of the secondary effects resulting from the kind of speech
communicated by student-athletes over Facebook and Myspace. The
secondary effects alleged by most institutions concern athletes' status
61. J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District, 807 A.2d 847, 854 (2002).
62. Id. at 855 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942)).
63. Id. at 854 (quoting Miller, supra, at 93).
64. Id. at 854 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
65. Id. at 854 (quoting Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969)).
66. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
67. Id. at 450.
68. J.S., 807 A.2d at 850-51.
69. Id. at 870.
70. 90 F.3d. 367 (1996).
71. J.S., supra note 61, at 858 (quoting Lovell, supra note 70, at 372).
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as role models. Institutional administrators argue that when other stu-
dents view an athlete's profile and see hints of drug and alcohol abuse,
or sexually explicit content, the entire institution suffers as a result of
poor reputation. But a decline in the morals of the student population
does not rise to the level of secondary effects justifying any limitation
on student speech.
May the government prohibit the speech because it takes place on
governmental property, is made by government employees, or made
by those accepting government funds? Because many athletes receive
federal funds as part of their scholarship, this question requires fur-
ther consideration. The Court in Rust v. Sullivan7 2 upheld restrictions
on speech by those accepting federal funds.7 3
The challenged statute in Sullivan prohibited recipients of govern-
ment funds from engaging in abortion counseling, referral, and provi-
sion of information regarding abortion as a method of family
planning.74 The Supreme Court held that the statute did not violate
the First Amendment free speech rights of recipients, their staffs, or
their patients by impermissibly imposing viewpoint-discriminatory
conditions on government subsidies because the government, in issu-
ing regulations, did not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, but
simply chose to fund one activity to the exclusion of another.75 Fur-
thermore, the regulations were implemented to ensure that appropri-
ated funds were not used for activities, including speech, that are
outside the scope of the federal program. 76
Does this holding extend to a public university's restrictions on stu-
dent-athletes' speech on Myspace and Facebook based on scholar-
ships awarded to these individuals? It seems that such institutions
may be successful in making such an argument, but what about those
individuals receiving scholarships for academics or other reasons? Do
they have to be censored as well, or can the institution make an argu-
ment that only the funds initially awarded to athletes are better used
by others in activities within the scope of such a scholarship program?
Is the speech at issue of a sexual nature, requiring prohibition by
local communities based on sexual mores? The majority of cases deal-
ing with sexually explicit speech concern material of a much more ob-
scene nature than anything allowed on Facebook or Myspace. Since
these sites have their own filtering devices in order to comply with
72. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
73. Id. at 173.
74. Id. at 176.
75. Id. at 176.
76. Id. at 176.
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Internet obscenity laws they would not likely offend the average per-
son, applying contemporary community standards.77
Finally, is the kind of speech taking place on these online social
networks likely to inflict unacceptable harm? While it is possible that
some of that speech may fit into the category of fighting words, de-
fined as those inherently likely to provoke violent reaction,78 defama-
tion, obscenity, or even a true threat, courts have repeatedly held, in
cases involving speech suppression, that the freedom of expression of
all may not be limited based on a finding of unprotected speech by
some. Such a prohibition is over-inclusive by regulating more than
those it seeks to regulate, which has repeatedly been struck down as
unconstitutional by courts.
B. Internet Speech
Since the advent of the Internet, questions have been raised as to
appropriate speech therein, especially since use of the Internet has
become so common among children. The question often raised is
whether the advent of the Internet changes First Amendment analysis
in favor of greater restrictions on the content of antisocial speech, spe-
cifically that antisocial speech that encourages illegal conduct. Those
advocating increased limitations point to cases involving violent acts
learned through the Internet, crimes facilitated by contact through
chatrooms or on sites such as Facebook and Myspace, the dissemina-
tion of information regarding the use or manufacturing of destructive
devices, and, with respect to college athletes, encouragement of un-
derage drinking.
But the standard of immediacy is the same for Internet speech as it
is for that spoken in public protests, as in Brandenburg v. Ohio.79 The
speech, whether political in nature or not, must constitute an immedi-
ate incitement of illegal conduct, not merely at some indefinite future
time.80
It is easy to see why some concern exists as to the availability and
limited restrictions on access to websites containing information re-
garding violent or even terrorist acts. In order to obtain the Terror-
ist's Handbook and learn how to make and use bombs that could kill
thousands of people, one need only spend a few minutes waiting for
the contents to download. Proponents of online speech regulation ar-
77. Miller, supra note 59, at 19.
78. Chaplinski, supra note 62, at 582.
79. 395 U.S. 444.
80. Id. at 450.
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gue the rise in Internet use directly correlates with the increasing
number of explosive devises found.8'
To justify regulations on Internet communication, proponents point
to the increasing dangers posed as the communications media become
more democratic, allowing individuals and groups to circumvent tradi-
tional gatekeepers in disseminating and obtaining dangerous informa-
tion. 82 But the argument in favor of restricting this kind of speech
cannot rest on the impossible assumption that these dangerous ideas
can be eliminated.
The government has consistently rejected such an approach, along
with its justification, reasoning that the democratic concept of virtu-
ally unconstrained free speech, as articulated by Holmes and Brandeis
depends on rational self-constraint, a product of a system allowing in-
dividuals the right to decide personally what information to endorse
and renounce. 83
Terrorism aside, there are a number of other sites argued to foster
illegal acts. The Simon Wiesenthal Center has advocated stricter scru-
tiny of hate speech on the Internet, pointing to the proliferation of
sites run by white supremacist groups.8 4 While the United States is
still reluctant to abandon our democratic conception of free speech
without a compelling reason, governments in countries with no First
Amendment protections have the legal authority to shut down these
sites under general hate speech laws, and Germany and France have
made the providers of Internet service subject to prosecution if they
provide service to hate speech sites. 5
But the nature of the speech has not changed merely by placing it
on the Internet. The increase in transmission of such information
more easily, and to more people, can only justify increasing restric-
tions on speech over the Internet if this ease of communication cre-
ated conditions placing cyber speech outside the factual context in
which First Amendment protections have been applied.86
The government has made many attempts to zone cyber speech in
order to protect individuals against indecent communications, as was
the case in Reno v. ACLU. 87 The Child Decency Act at issue prohib-
81. Gey, supra note 56, at 186.
82. Id. at 188-89.
83. Id. at 188 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376-77 (1927)).
84. Id. at 188 (quoting Mark Mueller, Hate Groups Spewing Venom on the Net, Boston Her-
ald, Sept. 15, 1996, at 1).
85. Id. at 188 (quoting Elizabeth G. Olson, As Hate Spills Onto the Web: A Struggle Over
Whether, and How, to Control It, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1997, at D11).
86. Id. at 188.
87. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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ited the transmission of patently offensive or indecent communica-
tions over the Internet.88  The Court held this Act to be
unconstitutional as a violation of free speech, but the concurring opin-
ion argued that the underlying intent to create adult zones on the In-
ternet can be constitutionally sound, if adults are still able to obtain
the regulated speech through gateway technology using adult verifica-
tion numbers or credit cards to access such sites, as well as tagging
websites containing regulated speech.8 9
So do adult students need to be protected from indecent sexual
comments posted on online social networks? Do photos of underage
partying incite immediate illegal conduct? Given the strict scrutiny
applied in previous cases, one can definitively say no. So how is it that
higher learning institutions can restrict their student-athletes' access
to communication through these sites?
IV. WHEN STUDENT-ATHLETEs ENGAGE IN INTERNET SPEECH
Sites like Facebook and Myspace have hundreds of millions of users
globally. Many of these users are college students. The main function
of these networks is communication, allowing users to message each
other through instant messaging, traditional email, and bulletin post-
ings. This section will analyze online social networks and determine
whether student-athlete participation can constitutionally be banned
by institutional administrators.
A. Online Social Networks
Myspace and Facebook are the two most frequently used online so-
cial networks.90 Online social networks are collections of personal
pages, created by individual users who post information about them-
selves. These individual users are the only persons with access to de-
termine what information will be posted on their profile. Individual
profiles on Myspace can be viewed by the public as a default, while
Facebook limits viewers to those within the individuals' network. In-
dividuals using either network have the option of limiting their privacy
settings to only those they accept as friends.9'
When users register, they must agree to the site's terms of service
and privacy policies, including how and when the sites may collect in-
88. Id. at 846.
89. Id. at 886-91 (O'Connor. J., concurring).
90. Steve Rosenbush, Facebook's on the Block, Business Week Online, March 28, 2006, availa-
ble at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/mar2006/tc20060327_215976.htm.
91. Eric Danowitz, Myspace Invasion: Privacy Rights, Libel, and Liability, 28 J. Juv. L. 30, at
30 (2007).
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formation, how the sites track usage, and how they use the informa-
tion collected from individual profiles. These policies must be
accepted by the user attempting to register before they can gain access
to the networks.
Privacy issues arise from these networks' default settings. In the
school setting, parents and students are concerned with the increase in
disciplinary actions resulting from material posted on individual stu-
dents' profiles, claiming violations of privacy when the information
was posted off-campus. But do student-athletes' decreased expecta-
tions in privacy authorize administration to view their private profiles,
if they have increased privacy settings, and use the information ob-
tained through such a search to limit or prohibit student-athlete
speech therein?
In October 2005, Penn State University's football team won a dra-
matic game against Ohio State University, resulting in students rush-
ing onto the field, creating a chaotic near-riot. University police
officers were unable to make more than two arrests at the time of the
incident, but later used pictures posted by students on Facebook to
identify and refer around fifty more alleged offenders to the appropri-
ate authorities for punishment. 92
As discussed above, university police are using these websites to
charge students with underage drinking and noise violations at
George Washington University, Northern Kentucky University, and
the University of Kentucky. 93 In determining whether these privacy
invasions are constitutional, courts have acknowledged the special
problems presented by Internet communication, holding that analo-
gies to other physical objects, such as dresser drawers or file cabinets,
do not make sense in light of search and seizure laws applied to such
communications.9 4
In considering the reasonableness of a user's expectation of privacy,
the court will first consider whether the individual had an actual ex-
pectation of privacy. The ultimate question is whether the individual
has shown that he seeks to preserve something as private. 95 Much
debate exists as to whether posting information on what has been
compared to a bulletin board in terms of restricted access by third
parties, even if additional privacy measures have been taken, is suffi-
ciently private to obtain constitutional protection when the individual
92. Brock Read, Think Before You Share, Chron. Of Higher Educ. . Jan. 20, 2006, at 38.
93. Matthew J. Hodge, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Issues on the "New" Internet:
Facebook.com and Myspace.com, 31 S. Ill. U. L.J. 95, 95 (2006).
94. Id. at 101 (quoting United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (2001)).
95. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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has chosen to publicize such information. 96 Furthermore, the Su-
preme Court has consistently held that an individual has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information turned over to a third person.97
The next question in determining whether a privacy interest exists is
whether society is prepared to recognize an expectation of privacy in
that material.98 Because online social networks are such a new media,
originating less than five years ago, 99 little public opinion as to the
privacy interest expected therein is available since the Supreme Court
has yet to deal with this issue.'00
But even if Facebook and Myspace communication by individuals is
not afforded privacy, aren't those accessing such information afforded
the right to receive information, consistent with the First Amendment
as articulated in Bd. of Educ. V. Pico?101 Furthermore, isn't that right
enhanced in the privacy of one's home as in the case of Stanley v.
Georgia?l0 2 The court in Stanley emphasized that a man in his own
home has the right to read or watch whatever he chooses, without the
State interfering.10 3 Under this reasoning, schools would not have the
authority to regulate what their student-athletes view or read while
accessing online social networks from their home computers.
B. Student-Athlete Participation
We again return to the question of how it is that, given the collec-
tion of constitutional analysis discussed in the previous sections, insti-
tutions can restrict student-athlete participation in online social
networks such as Myspace and Facebook. Most do so through their
initial agreement with athletes signing on to play at their institution.
Others do so unchallenged. For those agreeing to restrictions, there is
no basis for challenging the institution since they freely gave up that
right as consideration for the privilege to play, a concept firmly
grounded in the principles of contract law.
But what if such a restriction came about after a player signed on,
without such a condition agreed to in their contract? The contract
would have to be modified and, if agreed to by the athlete, no issue
would be raised. If the athlete refused to the modified agreement, the
96. Hodge, supra note 93, at 101.
97. Id. at 104.
98. Katz, supra note 95, at 351.
99. Kevin Coughlin, The User Friendly Web Site Teens Can't Resist: Myspace.com is Fast Be-
coming the Online World's Place to Be, Star Ledger, December 5, 2005.
100. Hodge, supra note 93, at 104.
101. 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion).
102. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
103. Id. at 565.
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institution could possibly take away his or her privilege to play under
another contract provision. If another provision could not be found,
and the institution felt strongly enough to pursue the restriction, ath-
letes could file suit for First Amendment violations, so long as restric-
tions were placed on them by a state actor.
The first consideration the court would be required to make is
whether the regulation is subject to the First Amendment. In order to
fall within this category, the regulation must be one by a state actor, in
an attempt to restrict an individual's freedom of speech. Assuming
the institution being challenged were public, administrators would be
considered state actors for the purpose of constitutional analysis.
Then the court must consider whether the speech sought to be re-
stricted is traditionally subject to First Amendment protection. So
long as the speech does not fit into an unprotected category, and its
secondary effects do not lead to an immediate incitement of illegal
conduct, the speech will fall within the protection of the First Amend-
ment. Unprotected speech includes fighting words, 104 obscenity,10 5
certain types of defamatory speech,' 0 6 and true threats.107
Next, the court must consider the institutions' interests sought to be
protected by such a restriction and balance it against the individual
student-athletes' fundamental right to freedom of speech. In most
cases, as previously stated, the institutions' stated interests have been
in the health, safety, and morals of its athletes, as well as upholding
the reputation of the institution through those in highest regard, its
role model athletes.
Absent proof that speech communicated through such networks ac-
tually causes the harms sought to be protected against, a legitimate
interest cannot be recognized. Furthermore, upholding the institu-
tions reputation is clearly insufficient to result in student suppression.
Because the court has not dealt with this issue, inferences must be
made from related areas, such as restrictions by institutions of student
participation in other social networks, primarily, membership in the
Greek system. Fraternities and sororities have been around since
higher education came about, and provide important social network-
ing for their members. But the behavior sought to be suppressed in
those cases, mainly underage drinking and violent acts resulting there-
from, is similar to that of online social networks.
104. Chaplinsky, supra note 62, at 571.
105. Miller, supra note 59, at 93.
106. Id. at 856 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
107. Id. at 856 (quoting Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969)).
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The Court held in Gott v. Berea College1os that rules forbidding
membership in Greek-letter fraternities or other secret societies are
within the power of college authorities to make and enforce, whether
the institution is public or private.109 Another court later expanded
on this holding, and further held that a resolution of the board of
trustees of a state university banning social organizations having an
affiliation with any national or other organization outside the univer-
sity does not violate any federal constitutional rights of the members
and affiliates of national fraternities and sororities.1 10
But those arguing that such a holding has no bearing on those in-
volved in online social networks need only point to the fact that the
interests in health and safety of its student body asserted by institu-
tions in those cases where social organizations are meeting in person
do not exist in cases where the social organization is online, an argu-
ment that may not be accepted since those who communicate online
through social networks often meet in person as well and therefore,
the legitimate concerns justifying a ban on the Greek system still
stand.
V. CONCLUSION
As participation in online social networks such as Myspace and
Facebook increases, so do concerns regarding the dangers posed by
such a far-reaching network. From privacy concerns to free speech,
users face a growing need to protect themselves when using such net-
works. With increased participation in the general population comes
increased participation by student-athletes, many of whom join before
reaching college athletics. With increased concern over the dangers
posed comes increased concern for student-athletes by their athletic
departments. Whether these departments seek to restrict the informa-
tion that can be placed on a student-athlete's profile or to eliminate
the creation of a student-athlete's profile all together, their concerns
and justifications raise further concern in student-athletes, students,
parents of students, and the general population.
In order to minimize concern by those opposed to online social net-
work limitations and restrictions, it seems that athletic departments
are taking the appropriate measures by communicating their regula-
tions in initial players' contracts so that no claim of student censorship
can later be made by student-athletes. Whether this is enough to
108. 161 S.W. 204 (1913).
109. Id. at 208.
110. Webb v. State University of New York, 125 F,Supp. 910, 910 (1954).
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shield them from lawsuits remains a mystery given the infancy of on-
line social networks and the lack of precedent that exists regarding
such limitations and restrictions.
It is my inclination that, regardless of whether such a contract exists
at the time the student-athlete signs on, courts will be reluctant to
consider these regulations by athletics departments to be constitu-
tional violations, in light of previous holdings regarding bans on mem-
bership in other social organizations.
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